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Abstract
Acquisition and divestment decision situations are generally
characterized by complexity and ambiguity. The authors hypothesize that
decision-makers use certain cognitive simplification processes in such
situations. Examples from recent field research and the business press
indicate the plausibility of such hypotheses. Impacts on resulting
decisions are discussed; future research directions are suggested.

COGNITIVE SIMPLIFICATION PROCESSES
IN ACQUISITION AND DIVESTMENT DECISION-MAKING
Introduction
Strategic management researchers have recently begun to recognize the
importance of information processing limitations for strategic decision-making
(Taylor, 1975; Hogarth and Makridakis, 1981; Schwenk, forthcoming). In explain-
ing the nature, content and timing of strategic decisions, behavioral and non-
rational impacts on the decision process must be taken into account. It seems
reasonable that the more complex, unstructured and strategic a decision is, the
more likely it is that limitations on processing the complex information asso-
ciated with it might be operating, and that less-than-rational influences might
affect the decision process.
Acquisition and divestment decision-making, like other major strategic
decisions, involves complexity, ambiguity and lack of structure.* Gilmour's
(1973) study of the divestment decision process characterizes divestments as
difficult and painful decisions for which hard analytical decision support was
either unavailable or unused. Duhaime's (1981) study of influences on the divest-
ment decision process lends further support, finding that divestment decisions
result most often from a complex interaction of influencing factors, seldom from
the individual influences of single factors. Similarly, decisions on whether
and what a firm should acquire are generally made in the face of more informa-
tion than can reasonably be considered and are further complicated by their rela-
tionship to formal and informal processes for determining organizational goals.
* Our discussion of cognitive simplification processes operating in acquisition
or divestment decision-making focusses on whole business units or divisions of
firms, decisions of whether to enter a new business or exit from an existing
one. We specifically exclude from the scope of this paper the acquisition or
divestment of assets alone, on the belief that such decisions tend to be much
more well-structured situations to which the analytical techniques of capital
budgeting can be (and are) readily applied.
It has been suggested that in order to function in such ill-structured
situations, and to avoid the stress which such ambiguity produces, decision-
makers may use perceptual processes or heuristics for simplifying information
processing and acquisition or divestment decisions. As Tversky and Kahneman
state: "In general, these heuristics are quite useful. However, in some cases
they can lead to severe and systematic errors." (1974, p. 1125)
In this paper, we suggest that there may be some systematic and predictable
biases or simplification mechanisms in use in both acquisition and divestment
decision processes. Further, we contend that four principal biases from the
organizational behavior and cognitive psychology literatures can be used to de-
scribe and explain the types of decision-making errors observed in some cases of
ill-considered acquisitions followed by unsuccessful turnaround attempts and even-
tually by divestment. We will examine and discuss these four cognitive "biases"
or simplification processes in the context of major activities of acquisition
and divestment decision-making. Examples of the operation of each of the biases
will be given, drawn from two primary sources: published information on specific
companies and recent field research involving personal interviews conducted by
the first author. Examples taken from the field research will not be identified
by company name in this paper because confidentiality was promised to the re-
search participants.
Potential Biases in Acquisition and Divestment Decisions
We frequently read of businesses divested at a loss whose managers report
that the original decisions to acquire those businesses were mistaken. Their
descriptions of the acquisition and divestment processes reveal that many of
the biases or simplification processes identified in the cognitive psychology
literature may have been operating in those decisions. In this section, we
will discuss four of those biases, and the major acquisition and divestment
activities* on which we contend those biases operate, using examples to support
our arguments. Table 1 lists the activities and corresponding biases.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Reasoning by Analogy . I^enever acquisition is considered, management must define
the type of acquisition desired and the type of portfolio problem it addresses.
There is at least one cognitive process which may determine the manner in which
the problem will be defined. Steinbruner (1974) identified this process in his
review of decision research in cognitive psychology and called it reasoning by
analogy. Reasoning by analogy involves the application of simple analogies and
images to guide problem definition. Images and analogies are very common in
discussions of top level problems in businesses and government. In international
relations, the image of falling dominoes helped shape American policy toward
Southeast Asia (Steinbruner, 1974, p. 116). Business organizations and their
problems are often defined using analogies to sports teams and well (or poorly)
oiled machines. In strategic decision-making, it typically involves the appli-
cation of analogies from simpler situations to complex strategic problems. This
process helps to reduce the uncertainty perceived in the environment.
In acquisition decisions, which involve a great deal of uncertainty and
complexity, the use of simple analogies may mislead the decision-makers into an
overly simplistic view of the situation (Steinbruner, 1974, p. 115). In the early
1970' s, the management of General Cinema was considering entering (through acqui-
sition) another line of business in addition to their theater and soft-drink
bottling operations. The acquisition candidate was seen by management in terms
* A number of models of the acquisition and divestment decision processes have
been developed, including those proposed by Gilmour (1973) , Boddewyn and Torne-
den (1976), Nees (1978), and Bing (1980). It is not within the scope of this
paper to reconcile these differing models; however, certain major activities
of acquisition and divestment decision-making are common to the various models.
We will therefore discuss the biases operating on those major activities.
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of the analogy of "the third leg of a stool" supporting the company's high rates
of return. This image or analogy suggested to company management that they
enter a line of business not closely related to General Cinema's current busi-
nesses and influenced the type of acquisition candidates considered. They even-
tually entered an agreement with a furniture retailer to finance the develop-
ment of a national chain of showrooms. This venture later appeared more and
more questionable as the retailer suffered increasing losses in the mid-1970' s,
and was finally abandoned (Uyterhoeven, 1976).
Illusion of Control . A process demonstrated by Langer (1975), called the illusion
of control, may account for managers' failure to thoroughly evaluate acquisition
candidates. Under the effects of this process, decision-makers may overestimate
the extent to which the outcomes of an acquisition are under their personal con-
trol and may assume that they can make the business succeed should problems
arise. Langer conducted six studies which showed that subjects making a variety
of decisions expressed an expectancy of personal success inappropriately higher
than the objective probability would warrant. They tended to overestimate the
impact of their skills on the outcome or to overestimate their skills.
Chock Full o'Nuts Corp. admits that their acquisition of Rheingold Brewer-
ies in 1974 was a serious mistake (Business Week , 11/7/77, pp. 81-84). By their
own assessment. Chock's management "didn't know anything about the beer business"
(p. 81), yet decided to acquire Rheingold, long a money loser. In managing that
acquisition, they then refused to delegate decision authority to the beer divi-
sion's managers. It appears that the illusion of control was operating both on
the decision to acquire and on subsequent management of Rheingold, which was
eventually divested.
The illusion of control tendency appears to be stronger in individuals who
have experienced prior successes; it may therefore be especially strong in
upper-level managers involved in strategy formulation and acquisition/divest-
ment decisions. Having risen to the top in their organizations, they would
tend to view themselves as successful decision-makers. This bias may also
affect executives' evaluation of a unit's performance after acquisition, caus-
ing them to attribute unfavorable gaps between expectations and performance to
chance rather than to the weakness of the unit. Attributing performance gaps
to chance helps preserve their belief in the quality of their decisions.
Spun off by Proctor & Gamble Co. in an anti-trust settlement, Clorox Co.'s
management made a string of acquisitions in an effort to diversify Clorox from
its single mature product line. Many of those acquisitions were far afield
from the firm's strengths and have since been divested. The P&G-trained mana-
gers running Clorox may have experienced the illusion of control because of their
past decision-making successes or because their management experience was in
situations where there was more control (strong staff support at P&G in market-
ing, research, etc.) (Business Week , 3/3/80, pp. 42-43). Illusion of control
also appears to have been operating when Ralston Purina acquired Green Thumb
Co. without a thorough analysis, then failed to turn the losing operation around.
A former company executive was quoted: "We did so well for so long, we got
reckless." ( Business Week , 9/10/79, p. 112)
Some managers interviewed by the first author described acquisitions of
business units at the next "downstream" stage from the firms' basic or histori-
cal businesses, which were later divested when management realized that the firm
did not have the requisite managerial skills to compete in the new industry
stage. Illusion of control may have been operating to prevent that realization
at the time of acquisition (1981, p. 156). Similarly, managers described acqui-
sitions (later divested) whose market, customer or technical relationships to
the firms' existing businesses led those firms to mistakenly believe they would
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be successful acquisitions; as one manager later said, "We saw 'shared custo-
mers' when we acquired it, but failed to see that it required a completely
different distribution system." (1981, p. 170)
Escalating Commitment . After going through the often lengthy and difficult pro-
cess of evaluating acquisition candidates, executives may be strongly committed
to a unit they finally acquire. This commitment may persist despite subsequent
evidence of unit performance well below expectation.
Staw and his colleagues, in laboratory studies using simulated investment
tasks, demonstrated escalating commitment to a chosen alternative despite nega-
tive feedback. They found that once individuals commit a significant amount of
money to an investment project, they will tend to allocate more funds to the
project if they receive feedback indicating that the project is failing than
if they receive feedback indicating that the project is succeeding. The feel-
ing of personal responsibility for the project apparently induces decision-
makers to remain with their chosen project despite evidence that it is not pay-
ing off. An excellent review of these studies is found in Staw (1981). In
these studies, it is obvious that the decision-makers perceive the discrepancy
indicating a project's failure (since they allocate more money to projects
which appear to be failing) , but do not use this perceived discrepancy to alert
them to the need to change their strategy. Rather, they seemed to interpret
negative feedback as a signal to commit more funds to save the project. Other
research indicates that decision-makers may explain a perceived discrepancy
between unit performance and expectation as a result of chance factors rather
than as a result of a flaw in initial strategy. If they adopt this interpreta-
tion, they are likely to persist in the current course of action and escalate
commitment to it.
Escalating commitment may be indicated by Harris Corp.'s sustaining severe
losses in the printing press business, their historical line, before eventually
deciding to divest it (with a large writeoff) in the mid-1970 's (Business Week ,
10/10/77, pp. 120-124). Similarly, Gulf & Western's recent divestments of a
number of losing businesses acquired in the 1960 's have been criticized for
their belatedness, suggesting that escalating commitment to those businesses
may have been operating. Gulf & Western's ability to avoid the cash trap of
escalating commitment is complicated by two factors: first, the current manage-
ment team engineered expansion by acquisition (into those businesses) in the
1960's; second, the firm's basic strategy has been to seek "undervalued assets"
and turn them around with large doses of cash and/or management skill (Business
Week , 10/27/80, pp. 131-137). We are not suggesting that either the management
team or the firm's strategy should be discarded. Rather, we are pointing out
that under such conditions escalating commitment may be more likely; checks on
this bias should perhaps be built into the control systems of such organizations.
The "downstream" acquisitions studied in the first author's field research
and described in the previous section were generally unprofitable when divested.
This suggests that escalating commitment, perhaps fueled by the difficulty of
admitting lack of managerial skill, may have been operating in those situations.
Our contention that escalating commitment affects the management of some acqui-
sitions is further supported by managers' statements suggesting a relationship
between corporate earnings levels and divestment of low-performance units, to
the effect that some businesses had long been "money-losers," but it took a
downturn in corporate earnings to trigger their divestment decisions (1981, p. 175)
Sinojle Outcome Calculation . After a period of escalating commitment to a failing
acquisition, management may finally decide that it is time to consider divestment.
Divestment of certain units may also be considered for the first time when a new
CEO takes over or when a unit's chronic poor performance becomes noticeable to
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external constituents of the firm or to important internal parties such as other
division managers.
Some evidence suggests that once divestment is considered as a way of deal-
ing with a failing unit, it may quickly become the only alternative considered.
Steinbruner (1974), in his discussion of cognitive psychology research on
decision-making, provided some insights into this process. He suggested that
in any complex decision situation involving a number of potential alternatives,
decision-makers may engage in single outcome calculation . Rather than attempt-
ing to specify all alternative courses of action for dealing with a failing
unit as normative decision theory would suggest, decision-makers may focus on
a single goal and a single alternative (divestment) for achieving it. Stein-
bruner argues that, contrary to normative models of organizational decision-
making, uncertainty is often not resolved by probabalistic calculations of the
outcomes of alternatives. Rather, favorable outcomes are inferred for preferred
alternatives, while unfavorable outcomes are projected for non-preferred alterna-
tives. Thus divestment decision-making often involves a single-valued problem
and a single preferred alternative to which the decision-maker is committed from
the outset of the decision process (1974, pp. 122-123). Since this process allows
decision-makers to deny the unpleasant value tradeoffs which are always present
in a choice between alternatives, it significantly reduces the stress associated
with ill-structured decision-making.
Steinbruner suggests that decision-makers sometimes deal with non-preferred
alternatives through inferences of impossibility. In contrast to the suggestions
from normative decision theory, Steinbruner points out that decision-makers may
devote a good deal of effort to identifying the negative aspects of non-preferred
alternatives and attempting to convince themselves that they cannot be imple-
mented (1974, p. 119).
Gilmour's (1973) research on the divestment decision process was based
on field observation of a (necessarily) limited number of divestment decisions.
He describes divestment situations in which "...hard data. . .was prepared in
'support' of only one option (i.e., no alternatives), and tended to have been
prepared after the decision not before it (i.e., rationalization, not analysis)"
(1973, p. 295). Although Gilmour does not use the term "single outcome calcu-
lation," we believe that his research descriptions, based as they are on field
observations, strongly support our contention that this bias may affect divest-
ment decision-making.
Single outcome calculation can sometimes bias decision-making in the form
of a focus on negative evaluation criteria to force elimination of particular
alternatives or sets of alternatives. A possible example of this is provided
by Household International's (then Household Finance Corp.) program of diver-
sification into retailing, manufacturing and other areas when faced with in-
creasing competition in its basic business, financial services, in the 1960 's
and 1970 's (Business Week , 9/25/78, pp. 124-125). So defensive was their diver-
sification effort that opportunities to expand within financial services were
virtually ignored (they were negatively evaluated as non-diversification alter-
natives) ; those lost opportunities were a source of later regret for top manage-
ment when the damage sustained by the flagship business during that period of
negative evaluation became apparent.
Single outcome calculation also appeared to influence some divestments
studied by the first author. For example, some managers indicated that the
decisions to sell certain units were essentially made when buyers approached
the firm; dissatisfaction with the business over a period of years made the de-
cision to divest nearly immediate (1981, p. 172). Focus on single evaluation cri-
terion may also have affected the decision to divest a large unit described as
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"a drag on corporate debt capacity" (1981, p. 173).
Conclusion
As was noted earlier, the intent of this paper is not to prove that
cognitive simplification processes affect acquisition and divestment decisions
but to suggest hypotheses about the ways decision-makers may simplify such de-
cisions. The purpose of this concluding section is twofold: first, to discuss
the type of research which should be done in the future to document the presence
of these simplification processes and second, to suggest ways of minimizing
the negative effects of the processes if they are demonstrated.
Implications for Research . Future research on this subject should attempt to
identify the effects of some of these cognitive processes on acquisition and
divestment decisions and thereby to increase the interface between the fields
of cognitive psychology, behavioral decision theory and strategic management.
Future research of this type should take two directions. First, since many
of the simplification processes have been examined exclusively in laboratory re-
search, an attempt should be made to document their existence and effects in
field settings. Researchers may be able to identify the processes in executives'
detailed descriptions of their own acquisition and divestment decisions. Field
observation of decisions may also provide insights into the effects of these pro-
cesses; such research efforts would of course be limited by the difficulty of
obtaining access to observe firms' sensitive strategic decisions.
A second approach would involve further laboratory research investigating
the effects of these processes using tasks more representative of the ill-struc-
tured problems encountered in acquisition and divestment decision-making. Such
concurrent laboratory and field research has been advocated as the most fruitful
approach to research for several questions in strategic management (Schwenk, 1982a)
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Implications for Practice . Though future research is necessary to demonstrate
the existence of these biases, we have shown that they may operate to bias
acquisition and divestment decisions. Therefore, it is appropriate here to
discuss methods for reducing these biases or minimizing their effects.
Research supports the contention that cognitive biases are more likely
to affect organizational decisions when there is a high level of consensus
among group members or when a single powerful member can dictate the assump-
tions which will drive the formulation of the problem (Janis, 1972; Janis and
Mann, 1977). The use of devil's advocates in such cases may reduce the effects
of these biases by encouraging decision-makers to clearly identify and actively
question their assumptions (Herbert and Estes, 1977; Schwenk, 1982b; Schwenk
and Cosier, 1980).
During the evaluation of acquisition candidates, individuals or groups
within the organization can be assigned to play the role of devil's advocate
and expose the potential weaknesses of potential acquisition candidates. A
kind of devil's advocate approach has been used for this purpose at Gould, Inc.
Here, a group designated the green team presented a case for particular candi-
dates to corporate executives while a group designated the red team presented
the strongest possible case against the candidates (Quinn, 1980, pp. 142-143).
During the management of an acquired unit, escalating commitment may be
exposed by a devil's advocate group arguing for divestment of the unit. Finally,
if corporate- level executives are considering divestment of a unit and there is
a danger of single outcome calculation, they would be well advised to listen
carefully to recommendations for improving unit performance from those respon-
sible for managing the unit. They may be the most effective devil's advocates
in such cases.
TABLE 1
tlAJOR ACQUISITION AND DIVESTJffiNT ACTIVITIES
AND COGNITIVE SIMPLICATION PROCESSES OPERATING ON THEM
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ACTIVITIES COGNITIVE BIASES
Consideration of Alternative
Acquisitions
Reasoning by Analogy
Illusion of Control
Management of the Acquisition Illusion of Control
Escalating Commitment
Consideration of Divestment;
Decision
—
Single Outcome Calculation
13.
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